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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA, 
Petitioner-Appellant. 
vs. 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden; 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, Utah State 
Attorney General, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Case No. 870534-CA 
Category 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of a Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether petitioner could raise issues in a post-
conviction relief action which were not raised on direct appeal? 
2. Whether petitioner could have raised his claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Aggravated 
Assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S76-5-103 (1978, as amended), in a jury trial held October 21-22, 
1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, 
presiding. Judge Conder sentenced petitioner on March 31, 1986, 
to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction 
in State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984 (Utah 1986). (See Addendum 
"A") 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, 
presiding. (R. 2). Upon the State's motion, Judge Sawaya 
dismissed the petition because petitioner could and should have 
raised all issues concerning his conviction on direct appeal. 
(R. 44-6). (See Addendum MB") Petitioner now appeals that 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioner visited his estranged wife early in the 
morning of August 21, 1985 (R. 22). Upon learning she had spent 
the night with another man, petitioner became enraged (R. 22). 
Petitioner left, obtained a gun, and returned to his wife's 
apartment (R. 22). Petitioner beat, kicked, and threatened the 
other man until petitioner successfully chased him from the 
apartment (R. 22). 
Angered, petitioner's wife ordered petitioner out of 
her apartment (R. 22). Petitioner administered a severe and 
vicious beating upon his wife (R. 22, 23). In the course of the 
beating, petitioner shot his wife in the shoulder (R. 22). 
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of 
aggravated assault (R. 22). Petitioner's conviction was affirmed 
by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal (R. 21-23) (See Addendum 
"A") . 
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Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus attacking his 
conviction (R. 2). On October 8, 1987, Judge Sawaya signed a 
minute entry dismissing the Writ and sent copies of the minute 
entry to the parties (R. 41, 44-46). Petitioner filed a notice 
of appeal on November 16, 1987, more than 30 days after the 
signed dismissal (R. 42). Judge Sawaya later entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order on January 5, 1988 (R. 44-
46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's alleged errors could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal and therefore cannot be raised for the 
first time in a post-conviction relief action. 
Petitioner had adequate opportunity to raise the issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and 
therefore cannot use his ineffectiveness claim to raise new 
issues in a post-conviction relief action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL 
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON DIRECT 
APPEAL. 
Petitioner first asserts that his petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus is not an attempt to circumvent proper appellate 
procedure. Defendant's assertion is meritless. 
As noted above, a minute entry was signed on October 8, 1987, 
dismissing petitioner's writ (T. 41). Copies were sent to the 
parties (T. 41). In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) the 
Utah Supreme Court said that "[a] signed minute entry may be a 
final order for purposes of appeal." Ld. at 171 n.l. Because 
petitioner filed his notice of appeal on November 16, 1987, 
-3-
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It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors 
could have been raised on direct appeal, this court is "precluded 
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them 
now." Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 9 (Sup. Ct. October 
26, 1988) In stating a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must 
allege an "obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a constitutional right in the trial of a matter; . . ." 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 
1101 (Utah 1983) clearly emphasized the standards for Habeas 
Corpus review: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have 
been but were not raised on appeal from a 
criminal conviction cannot be raised by 
habeas corpus or postconviction review, 
except in unusual circumstances. 
A much-quoted statement of the type of 
errors that are and are not cognizable by 
habeas corpus is the following from this 
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner, 
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 
(1968) (Crockett, C.J.): 
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordi-
nary remedy which is properly 
invocable only when the court 
had no jurisdiction over the 
Cont. petitioner exceeded the time limit for filing a notice 
of appeal as required by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court would therefore lack jurisdiction. 
However, the State recognizes that the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Rule 4(c), states that a notice of appeal "filed 
after the announcement of . . . an order but before the entry of 
the . . . order of the district court . . . shall be treated as 
filed after such entry and on the day thereof." !Id. Because the 
trial court entered Findings, Conclusions and an Order on January 
5, 1988, petitioner's notice of appeal could arguably be 
considered filed on the same date. 
-4-
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person or the offense, or where 
the requirements of law have 
been so disregarded that the 
party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process 
of law, or where some such fact 
is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine 
the conviction. If the 
contention of error is something 
which is known or should be 
known to the party at the time 
the judgement was entered, it 
must be reviewed in the manner 
and within the time permitted by 
regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and 
is not subject to further 
attack, except in some such 
unusual circumstance as we have 
mentioned above. Were it 
otherwise, the regular rules of 
procedure governing appeals and 
the limitations of time 
specified therein would be 
rendered impotent. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and 
emphasis in original). See also Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 9-10. 
The court in Codianna rejected the argument that 
ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily constitutes the 
"unusual circumstances" that would allow petitioner to bypass the 
regular appellate process in favor of Habeas Corpus. The court 
stated: 
To permit the inevitable instances of 
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify 
for the "unusual circumstances" exception 
would allow that exception to swallow up the 
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from 
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative 
appeal mechanism in contravention of the 
finality of criminal judgments that is the 
settled policy of this state. 
Id. at 1105. 
-5-
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The following must be considered in determining whether 
a conviction should be set aside on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: 
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendantf "and 
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter." State v. 
McNicol, 554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's 
"legitimate exercise of judgment" in the 
choice of trial strategy or tactics that did 
not produce the anticipated result does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205. (3) It 
must appear that any deficiency in the 
performance of counsel was prejudicial. 
State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 337, 339 
(1977); Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 
22, 465 P.2d 343, 345 (1970). In this 
context, prejudice means that without 
counsel's error there was a "reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been a 
different result. . ." State v. Gray, 601 
P.2d at 920. Similarly, as we noted in State 
v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of 
counsel to make motions or objections which 
would be futile if raised does not constitute 
ineffective assistance." 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1109. "If counsel's deficiencies 
were sufficiently grievous [to meet these requirements], they 
constituted a violation of due process that is clearly 
reviewable" in this action. Id. at 1105. 
In the present case, petitioner claims his attorney was 
ineffective because she did not press for admission of 
corroborating and mitigating evidence. However, petitioner fails 
to demonstrate how the result of his conviction would have been 
different had his attorney pressed for admission of such 
-6-
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corroborating and mitigating evidence. Petitioner has done 
nothing more than speculate that the result might have been 
3 
different. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that 
petitioner failed to plead inadequate representation amounting to 
a denial of due process justifying collateral review. 
Furthermore, petitioner knew or should have known, 
prior to appeal, that his attorney did not press to admit the 
above evidence. Therefore, petitioner knew or should have known 
prior to appeal whether or not his counsel was ineffective at 
trial. Consequently, petitioner is foreclosed from raising this 
issue in a post-conviction relief action. See Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d at 1105. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE 
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
Petitioner asserts that he could not have known about 
his counsel's ineffectiveness concerning his appeal until after 
the appeal was already filed. He then concludes that he could 
Petitioner asserts a conference occurred in chambers wherein 
the court decided to exclude the possible mitigating testimony. 
Petitioner further claims that he was not included in the 
conference. Petitioner cites to a trial transcript which is not 
a part of the record on appeal. Accordingly, this court should 
limit its review to the facts supported by the appellate record. 
State v. Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Utah 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
3 
Petitioner apparently takes the position that because he 
alleges that mitigating evidence exists, he has established a 
"demonstrable reality." Petitioner fails to explain how the 
content of the evidence would change the result of his trial. 
Merely alleging the existence of evidence without demonstrating 
the content of the evidence is insufficient to establish a 
"demonstrative reality." 
-7-
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not have raised ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
Petitioner's assertion is errornous. 
In Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court encountered the same claim. In Hafen, defendant 
was convicted and sentenced to prison. Jto., at 876. Hafen 
appealed and his conviction was affirmed. Id. Hafen then sought 
Habeas Review and claimed that his trial attorney "failed to 
honor his request to challenge a juror who appellant knew. 
Appellant also claimed that his trial attorney failed to raise 
that issue on appeal although appellant had so requested." Id., 
at 876. Naturally, petitioner Hafen in his post-conviction 
action claimed "he was denied effective assistance of counsel. . 
. " ^ d. The lower court: 
dismissed his petition on the ground that he 
had waived any right to raise the issue of 
the failure of his attorney to challenge the 
juror. The court determined that it would 
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that 
issue since it could have been raised at 
appellant's trial or on appeal. . . . 
Id. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated: 
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the 
contention of error is something which is 
known or should be known to the party at the 
time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some such 
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned 
above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules 
of procedure governing appeals and the 
limitations of time specified therein would 
be rendered impotent." 
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turner, 
supra, where the petitioner in a petition for 
habeas corpus attempted to raise as an issue 
-8-
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that the District Attorney had exceeded the 
bounds of propriety in his cross-examination 
of the petitioner at the trial. We there 
observed that since that was an issue which 
could have been raised on the petitioner's 
former appeal of his case to this Court, we 
would not take cognizance of it on a later 
petition for habeas corpus. 
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail 
to honor his request to challenge the juror, 
the appellant had the adequate opportunity at 
the trial to have made complaint to the 
court. Furthermore, following his conviction 
that issue could have been raised by him in 
this Court in his appeal which pended in tihis 
Court for many months, l.i 1 view of his 
silence, the trial judge correctly ruled that 
he had waived any claim of error in this 
regard. There are not here any of the 
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant 
v. Turner, supra. 
Id. 
In the instant case, petitioner had adequate 
opportunity -... . irect appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984 (Utah 
1986). Thus, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim i.innmt he i '^ns l dere I .in 'unusual circumstance" justifying 
an exception to the requirement that all claims of error be 
raised before the appellate court, other than i i leffective 
counsel, ;> • . r^t any addi tional "unusual 
circumstances Therefore, tr.e* trial court properly ru.ri that 
the petiti - * *< barred Jut to petitioner's cire „.:••--* 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the lower courts dismissal of the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus• 
DATED this ^ ^ ^ ^ y of November, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
-tt^f^-
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to John Francis 
McKenna, Pro Se, P. 0. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this 
day of November, 1988. 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
